Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senators.

Paul and I have, in our professional lives, spent a considerable

amount of time in this very room in front of this panel, and we

have come to realize, at least I have, that the patience of the committee

is in inverse proportion to the length of my opening statement.

So I am going to keep it very short, and I know you will

allow me to have my comments submitted for the record.

I just thought I would mention briefly the winners and the losers

in the recent loya jirga, and what is left to do. I think the winners,

first of all, are pretty easy to enumerate: the Afghan people and,

particularly, women. This committee—the whole Congress, but this

committee in particular, has been very interested in all the women

in Afghanistan. I think the newspaper article in the New York

Times, to which you referred, Mr. Chairman, is witness to the fact

that in 6 months’ time, women have gone from being held basically

in contempt in Afghan society to a role where they felt secure

enough to take part in a very robust and boisterous loya jirga. So

the Afghan people, and women in particular, are the first winners.

Second, Hamid Karzai is clearly a winner. He is a much better

politician than any of us knew 6 months ago, and he managed competing

pressures very, very well. He has to be considered in the winner’s category.

Another is a Tajik by the name of Fahid Khan, who is the First

Vice President and still the Minister of Defense. He would have to

be considered to have come out a winner.

Fourth, the international community has been a winner, because

we have been part of, thus far, what is a great success story, and

I think it far outstripped in pace any ideas that any of the pundits

had about the ability to resolve the questions of Afghanistan in

anywhere near this rapid timeframe.

The fifth winner are the coalition forces. Primary among them,

of course, the United States and the ISAF, because in the minds

of many in Afghanistan, there is not much difference between the

coalition and ISAF. And we are the ones who made it possible for

the Afghan people to eschew the role of the gun and the rule of the gun.

Now, who are the losers? Well, I think you have to consider, at

least in the short term, that the conservatives are the losers. They

lost some serious altitude during the loya jirga. They were boisterous.

There was some intimidation, or at least attempts at it,

mostly verbal, but they lost ground.

The second people who lost ground were some of the families of

Zahir Shah, who envisioned a much greater role, a more active role

for the former king, and they did not have their dreams realized.

I think, third, one has to realize that there are some in the

Pushtun community who feel that they lost ground, or they did not

command as many portfolios as they might have hoped. There is

a lot of misinformation in the public about what the makeup of Afghan

society really is. In percentage terms, we have not had a census

since 1979, so any numbers that anybody talks about are extrapolations

from 1979. We do not know what percentage the

Pushtuns or the Tajiks really have in the overall population, but

I think it is fair to say that some in the Pushtun community are a little disappointed.

Now, what is left for President Karzai to do? Well, I think, first

and most importantly, he has to consolidate the instruments of

power and he has to extend them out into the countryside to get

to the very thing you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, and that is warlords and warlordism.

Second, I think Afghanistan’s society has to come to grips with

the role of Islam in their nation. Do they envision themselves as

a Turkey, or a Pakistan, or what? And I think that is a debate that

we are going to see and witness as we move to the future.

Finally, Mr. Karzai and the 29 ministers who make up his cabinet

have to very definitely be seen in relatively rapid fashion, not

only formulating a constitution to be voted on in about 18 months,

but to be able to extend the fruits of the international community’s

largesse, particularly in terms of reconstruction aid to far-flung

areas in Afghanistan. Those are three pretty big challenges for any

cabinet and any President. Mr. Chairman, I will stop there, and

turn it over to my colleague and friend, Paul Wolfowitz.

Mr. Chairman, I will give it a go first. You asked

at the beginning what is the warlords’ agenda. In effect, it is the

same as it has been in the past. It is to hold on to power and be

able to collect revenues. They want to be a large factor in whatever

the future holds for Afghanistan.

No. 2, you would have a very good sense of this after your excellent

trip in January out there. The warlords, particularly the one

to whom you referred, Mr. Dostam, feels that he and some of his

Tajik colleagues have had the majority of the burden in the fighting,

and they want the majority of the spoils.

The latter question about is it our role to be involved in reconstruction,

it seems to me that the President has made the decision

that it is. He said that we are going to be involved for a long time

and he made that very clear. We are going to be involved for a long

time, not just in the sphere, which Paul and Secretary Rumsfeld

are so responsible for in the military sphere, but in the reconstruction,

along with the international conference.

I think the fact that it was the United States, which was the convener,

if you will, of the Tokyo Conference, it indicated that we are

not going to have a half-measure. We are not going to make the

mistake we made in 1989 and allow what is a very nation-state to

backslide into becoming a swamp again.

First of all, Mr. Chairman, these warlords have

access to their own resources for a lot of different reasons, some of

them very bad, like drugs, and they can do anything with that,

such as build roads, or anything else that they are able to.

Our money goes into the central government, and we have relatively

little, thus far, representation in the far-flung locations.

This is why I put a lot of stock in what Paul was saying, by attaching

USAID and State officers to the Special Forces units, whether

they be in the number of a dozen or several dozen in various areas,

so they can give us better advice on what sort of projects might

reasonably be funded out of the central government’s coffers.

Senator Lugar, I will commit to sending a letter

to the committee, outlining just this, but I want to respond directly

to your question, but it would be necessarily a lengthy response, and we’ll do it.

To the extent we have well developed thinking, and I appreciate

your comments about the need for a little improv along the way,

security is the overarching necessity. And, underneath that, we

have agriculture, for the obvious reasons, and health, the next two

in order of priority, and the reasons are quite obvious, because one

half of the 26-plus million people in Afghanistan have a need either

in the health area or in the food area. They have malnutrition, et cetera.

So that gives you a pretty good idea of your next two priorities,

and after that, education, which is right up next to it, and then infrastructure

development. That is just sort of the priority, as we

see it, and we are trying to put our money against it.

Right now, Senator, in answer to your specific comments about

democracy, human rights, et cetera, we have 21 State people at our

embassy in Kabul, and seven USAID people, one person who covers

human rights, and one who covers religious freedom and democracy.

So I think, given the 10 percent of our staffing there, that will

give you an idea of the emphasis we are putting on it.

In terms of public diplomacy, I am pleased with our story. You

are the ultimate judge, and I appreciate your comments about

Under Secretary Beers, but in the last 4 months, we have increased

Radio Free Afghanistan broadcasting to 7 hours a day. We

have Voice of America, up from 2.5 to 6 hours a day. We have two

transmitters being built, which will provide 24/7 coverage for radio,

the principle means of communications in Afghanistan.

We have exchange programs, one ongoing now with young students,

called the Seeds of Peace program, and we have 12 participants

here in the United States, and in August, we will have 18

women from the Women in Government group visit. We could have

had it earlier, but we did not know who was going to be in government,

and who was going to be around. So now that they have had

their loya jirga, we are bringing them in August.

We are dealing in the country with a literacy rate that is about

15 percent above the age of 15. So printed materials are not a desired

medium across the board, unless they are very much pictographs.

So I think we are alert to the problems of public diplomacy.

I will send a letter to the committee with our full thinking and the

numbers we think would be associated with this over the next several years, Senator.

Indeed.

Sir, we are very bullish on the National Endowment

of Democracy, as a general matter. We are going to make use

of them in many countries around the world. I have Ambassador

David Johnson with me here today, and he can provide the specifics

about whatever contracts we may have with them right now. I do not know.

Of the 21 people, as I mentioned, in the embassy now, we have

two devoted to the issues that you mentioned. We are going up to

31 State people over the summer. We are only limited by the fact

that they are living in trailers, and we have a chancery that partly

works and partly does not. We do not have any living quarters, et cetera.

They do, sir. I will not tell the story you told us about it.

We have the money in the supplemental, sir, for

that, and I am anticipating no problem, other than getting the supplemental voted on.

On the larger question of the necessity of a success, particularly

in the Muslim world; absolutely, but it is tied, I think, to the country

you mentioned earlier, Pakistan. I do not think we are actually

going to have a success, unless we are successful in both countries.

President Karzai has informed us that he is quite convinced of

the sincerity of President Musharraf, and the fact that notwithstanding

10 or 11 years of a failed policy in Pakistan regarding

support for the Taliban, that right now, Pakistan is on the right

side of the ledger, President Musharraf is moving, I think, quite assiduously

against madrasses, making them at least registered, if

not getting rid of those that are beyond the pale. You saw in today’s

news broadcast that by virtue of the fact that he has ordered

his soldiers into the heretofore forbidden tribal areas, they are suffering

casualties very much at our behest, but I think the success

has to be the success of both countries.

Mr. Chairman, if I may.

You have an exquisite understanding of the problems

of women in Afghanistan, but I want to get on the record

about this. Security is the overarching one, but 23 years of war, the

years of Taliban rule, have all brought other things to the fore that

we have to be attacking simultaneously. It is not just a matter of

empowerment of women, which is important in and of itself. We

have an education problem.

During the Taliban rule, of those eligible for primary school, 39

percent of boys went to school, only 3 percent of women were enrolled

in school. Right now, out of 4.4 million primary school-eligible

kids, we have over 3 million enrolled, so almost 75 percent.

Now, women, or girls, lag behind boys, but we are well up to the

60 percentile mark of girls going to school.

If you look at the health care area, one in 15 Afghan women dies

as a result of a pregnancy, or a post-natal problem. That compares

to one in 3,000 here in the United States. One in four kids in Afghanistan

die before they are 5 years old. So we have a whole

bunch of problems to attack at the same time, and not just the ISAF ones.

What does the State Department guy sound like, Mr. Chairman?

Thank, God. I mean thank God, you do not sound like him.

Let me make sure I understand this. I was told the following,

with a U.S. colonel standing with me, who was a liaison to the

ISAF force, and a captain. After a 2-hour brief, I was told in February

and then again in May, that we said we would not be a part

of an expansion of ISAF, no U.S. boots would be on the ground

with an ISAF force, if it expanded.

Second, I was told by, and I do not want to—I was told by ISAF

officers that they thought that would be all right, if we had made

a commitment to be an extraction force, if they expanded, or if we

were prepared to provide other guarantees of participation with

them. As the British one-star, whose name escapes me now, said,

‘‘Senator, how long do you think my Parliament will let me stay

here, absent your full participation with us?’’

I then met with Mr. Brohimi, who indicated that the Turks had

told him that they were looking forward to this command, as long

as the ‘‘big dog’’ was with them—us. When the President stated, as

I thought I heard him say, we would not be part of ISAF, the Secretary

of Defense said, I thought, I stand to be corrected, we would not be part of ISAF.

It is not at all surprising to me that the little dog said, ‘‘Well,

wait a minute. We are not interested in expanding.’’ So I am trying

to get that connection. Did we or did we not say we would be part

of ISAF, if it expanded? The way I got it was basically, ‘‘If you guys

want to expand, you go ahead, but do not count us in on the deal.’’

If that is what we said, there is no question no one is going to

expand ISAF. I am trying to get a sense here of what the real story is.

Senator Hagel, I think Paul and I would say we

have an integrated policy and strategy. I think he would be a better

judge of it, and you can tell us after you have examined this.

I mentioned two states, but I think you immediately could expand

it to the Central Asia region, the so-called front line states in the

war on terrorism. We have everything from the supplemental to

our appearances here in front of the committee and other committees.

We have made it very clear that we see it as a total package.

I think when you talk about Indonesia and others, it gets back

to our joy and pleasure with Turkey leading the ISAF, because it

makes the point, here is a Muslim country that’s leading, not a foreign

occupier trying to put some other religion on top of the nation’s

religion. It was a very deliberate choice of ours to go after

Turkey, to make the point that we are trying to make through public

diplomacy, that Paul was so eloquent about up there. We do not

want to occupy, we are not here to change your way of life, other

than a few items, and that once we have completed our task, wewill leave.

The public diplomacy aspects are, I think, the area where it is

almost tied together. We are able to make the point in the Muslim

world, and Indonesia, which you mentioned, is the largest Muslim

country in the world, that we are not opposed to the great religion

of Islam. We do this in a number of ways we think are integrated.

It is quite clear that terrorists themselves are not bound by any

geographic region. We have recently seen al-Qaeda—or have reports

of al-Qaeda meetings in Indonesia. Malaysia has accomplished,

I think, a magnificent endeavor on the arrest of the 15 terrorists,

along with Singapore, and arrested a bunch more. So I think we are pretty integrated.

We are not as far along in our public diplomacy strategy as we

ought to be, and I am sure Under Secretary Beers was quite open

about that. But if understanding is the beginning of wisdom, we

understand that, and then we will go ahead and try to get smarter on it.

I think the way that I look at it, Senator, is there

is nothing necessarily contradictory about Islam and democracy,

and beyond that, I agree with Paul, that they can choose their own

brand or form, et cetera, but that is, I think, kind of the basic——

Well, Senator, neither Paul or I are people who

look at the world through rose-colored glasses; and if we were, your

short history would certainly take care of that. But there is one difference,

and I will go through it now, and all of the 12 leaders who you mentioned.

First, we are trying to bring about several things at once. We are

trying to reduce the availability of money to certain warlords, the

eradication of the poppy and heroin crop, which will have, I think,

a positive effect on the country. We are trying to develop simultaneously

a national army, the French are training the battalion. We

are in the midst of our second battalion training, or will be on 1

July, to be a multi-ethnic national force. So that is part of it as well.

I think on the diplomatic side, the one difference from the previous

100 years is that, at least for a time, and this is at play now,

the great powers play the great game as something other than

zero-sum. That was certainly the case in Petersburg, the Bonn

agreement, where the Russians, the United States, the Iranians,

the Pakistanis, all worked positively toward Afghanistan, rather than in a more traditional way.

Now, our job in diplomacy is to try to make sure that prevails.

Now, there are some bad straws in the wind. The Iranians, as the

chairman mentioned, are busy in Herat. Thus far, the Russians

have been pretty good. We think the Pakistanis are playing the

game straight with us now, but it is something that is going to

take constant attention. Because if we are not successful in keeping

this as something other than zero-sum, then the Balkanization towhich you refer will be a fact.

Now, with regard to the constitution, over the next 18 months,

as the transitional government writes its constitution, I do not

know what they are going to come up with, but we are going to

make available to help them groups like the National Endowment

for Democracy. We have used the Asia Foundation for some activities,

up through the loya jirga, NGOs such as that, to try to give

them exposure to the best possible advice; but I do not know what

they are going to come up with at the end.

Well, we make great use of the United Nations

Special Representative, Ambassador Brahimi, who has worked very

closely with us. Secretary Powell speaks to Kofi Annan, the Secretary

General, regularly about Afghanistan. So we have not had

a bad experience. We have found them very helpful in the political buildup through

Bonn, the Petersburg Agreement, and laterally, as we went

through the loya jirga. But the structures that exist for reconstruction,

et cetera, are the G–8, the Afghan Support Group for Humanitarian

Aid, and the Afghan Reconstruction Support Group, cochaired

by the United States. So there are a bunch of ad hoc

groups that are responsible for the money, but there is no bad odor

associated with the United Nations, quite the contrary.

You will see, Senator Chafee, press reports of

some arms caches being identified by local populations, too; or the

coalition forces, or ISAF, and I think this is indicative of just what

Paul is saying. Thank you.

I wish you had not asked the question. You can

be optimistic, sir, if you stop the car in time.

That is a big thing. The point of our program is

to get people out of the poppy business and get them back in the

farming business, and we have supplied 7,000 metric tons of seed,

and 15,000 metric tons of fertilizer, getting ready for the fall planting

season, which would be realized, of course, in the spring.

At the same time, USAID and the international community are

trying to put together, again, the infrastructure for the delivery of

water. The drought has continued and, at least in my building,

they say now it is a drought of almost biblical proportions; but

there was a water system that transferred water from the mountains,

where there were snows, et cetera, at one time. We are trying to rebuild that.

Along with talking people out of growing poppy, there are other

ways to get them out of the business, and to dissuade them from

poppy cultivation. Some of it is covert, obviously, but part of it is

international. We have worked very closely with the Russians, who

realize they have a huge problem in Moscow, because that is where

the heroin goes first now, to have them do a better job with the

border control, and to be more of a prosecutorial mind set, in terms

of drug flow, and this is happening to some extent.

I do not want you to accuse us of being optimists. We realize just

what the chairman and others have said, this is a long, tough slog,

and we have started on the journey, and the good news is that the

President of the United States has said we are in it for the long

run. We realize it is not going to be a 1, 2, 3-year fix. If you look

at 23 years of war and 31⁄2 years now of drought, it gives you an

idea of the enormity of the task, and the fact that literally a generation

is without education. So we are going to be at it for a long,

long time. It is not a matter of optimism or pessimism, I think,

Senator, it is a matter of just realism, and willingness to put the shoulders to the grindstone.

It is a generally held view, Senator Nelson, that

nothing would represent success in a greater way for al-Qaeda than

a dandy little war between India and Pakistan. They would be the only beneficiary.

No, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.